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The distribution of wealth is one of the most impor-
tant and least studied features of our economic life. A
lack of good data on household wealth is the primary reason
for the inadequate attention to this subject. Moreover, the
evidence that is available from household surveys and estate
records excludes the most important asset of the vast major-
ity of households: the value of future social security ben-
efits.1 Thepurpose of the current paper is to present evi-
dence on the distribution of social security wealth and to
use these estimates to analyze the impact of alternative
methods of adjusting future benefits for changes in the
price level.
*}jarvard University and the National Bureau of Economic
Research. This study is part of the program of research on
social insurance of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for finan-
cial support and to Michael Boskin, Michael Darhy and William Hsiao
for useful comments. The paper has not been reviewed by the
Board of Directors of the NBER.
1See Smith (1975), Part IV, for several recent contri-
butions to the study of the distribution of wealth.
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Social security wealth is defined as the actuarial
present value of the social security benefits to which an
individual becomes entitled at age 65.1 Thesum of ordinary
(fungible) wealth and social security wealth is equal to the
value of the retirement annuity that an individual couldbuy
at any time. Equivalently, this sum equals thepresent
value of the consumption in the retirementyears after age
65 that would be possible if the individual didno future
saving.2 For the currentpaper, we are interested in social
security wealth as part of an accurate description of an in-
dividual's total wealth and will not exploreany of the im-
plications of social security wealth for savings behavior.
One plausible implication that we have examined elsewhere
(Feldstein and Pellechio, 1977) is that social security
wealth induces households to reduce their accumulation of
other wealth by an equal amount; if this is correct, the
total wealth distribution that could be estimated byadding
fungible wealth and social security wealth is also the dis-
tribution of ordinary fungible wealth that would haveex-
isted in the absence of social security.3
1The idea of socialsecurity wealth was introduced in
Feldstein (1974); a more detailed description of itscon-
struction is presented in section 1 of the currentpaper.
2Note that we do not subtract future socialsecurity taxes.
The current measure of social security wealth plus ordinary fun-
gible wealth plus human capital (based on labor income net of
tax) represents the lifetime budget constraint.
3The extent to which socialsecurity wealth displaces or-
dinary wealth is a controversial issue; see Barro (1076), Darby
(1977) ,Feldstein(1976b) ,Kotlikoff(1977) ,andiunne11 (1976)
for recent evidence and discussions of earlier evidence.3
The present study is an extension of earlier research
on the distribution of social security wealth discussed in
Feldstein (l976a). That study was based on the 1963 Federal
Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances (Projector and
Weiss, 1966), which provided survey data on the income and
fungible assets of approximately 2,000 households with a
heavy oversaxnp].ing of high income households. Although
these data probably provide the best informationon the dis-
tribution of fungible wealth, the basis forestimating so-
cial security wealth was very limited) Incontrast, the
current study uses a new source of data that permitsa very
accurate calculation of social security wealth; the precise
nature of the data and the estimation method are described
in the next section.
The focus of this paper is exclusively on socialse-
curity wealth. Studies of the wealth distribution could,
of course, be extended in a number of otherways. Some of
these, such as including the value of private pensions and
of other social insurance benefits, would be useful butare
much smaller than social security wealth. Other extensions
to include human capital, anticipated taxes, andanticipated
intergenerational transfers might be useful in soin contexts
but would blur the basic distinction between wealthand
'Socialsecurity wealth was estimated on the basis of
current earnings, age, and marital status; no information
on the earnings history was available. The assumption about
future benefits was also quite crude. The method is de-
scribed in detail in Feldstein (1976a).4
income that makes the study of wealth a subject ofindepen-
dent value.
It is now widely argued that the social security law
(as of 1977) contains a serious technical error thatre-
quires legislative correction. More specifically, the cur-
rent law adjusts benefits and taxable wages inresponse to
inflation in a way that is accurately described as "over-
indexed": an increase in the price level causes amore
than proportionate increase in social security benefits.'
In 1976, the Ford Administration proposed a method of price
adjustment that has become known as wage indexing; according
to this proposal, the tax and benefit schedules are adjusted
for changes in the average level of nominalwages. This
method has the effect of keeping the ratio of benefits to
previous earnings unchanged at each relative earnings level.
The wage indexing method has since been proposed by the
Carter Administration and by the key Senate and House com-
mittees. The analysis of this paper therefore focuses on
social security wealth under the assumption that the method
of wage indexing is adopted.
An alternative method of adjusting was proposed by a
panel of consultants appointed by the Congress and chaired
by William Hsiao (Consultant Panel on Social Security, 1976).
'See CongressionalBudget Office (1977) for a clear
description of this problem.5
The Hsiao proposal calls for adjusting the tax and benefit
schedules on the basis of changes in the price level and is
therefore known as price indexing. The price indexing
method would have substantial long—run advantages for the
economy) It is therefore worthwhileto analyze the impli-
cation of this major alternative for the total value and the
distribution of social security wealth. Ouranalysis of
price indexing (in Section 4) suggests the reason that it
lacks the political support that it deserveson long-run
economic grounds.
1These are discussed inFeldstein (1977) and Congres-
sional Budget Office (1977) as well as in the Consultant
Panel report.6
1. Data and Method of Estimation
The data used in this study are a unique combination
of household survey information combined with Social Secur-
ity Administration records for the same individuals (Scheuren
et al., 1975). The file is based on the March 1973 Current
Population Survey. The Social Security Administration has
matched summary information from its records with the sur-
vey information.
Our sample contains all such persons aged 25 years
and over whose CPS and SSA records are properly matched and
who are covered by the social security program. There are
61,327 persons, consisting of 23,529 married couples and
14,269 single individuals. We treat couples and single in-
dividuals as units of analysis; the sample thus contains
37,798 potential household observations. To reduce compu-
tation costs, we have used a sample of 10,000 observations.
The sampling weights permit the extrapolation of our results
to the entire population.
Our analysis estimates the social security wealth as
of the end of 1972 for each household (i.e., couple or
single individual) in the sample). Recall that this social
security wealth is the value of the benefits for which the
couple or individual will be eligible at age 65. These ben-
efits are calculated on the assumption that the current
(1977) method of double-indexing benefits for inflation will7
be replaced by the wage indexing method proposed by the
Carter and Ford Administrations.
A number of assumptions make our estimates an under-
statement of the total value of future social security ben-
efits. We focus exclusively on the retirement benefits of
the worker and, when appropriate, the dependent or survivor
benefits of his spouse. We exclude completely the value of
benefits going to surviving children and the value of dis-
ability benefits; these now amount to 30 percent of the re-
tirement and survivor benefits that we include. We ignore
the opportunity for early retirement; although there is in
principle an actuarial reduction of benefits, the opportu-
nity for self selection conveys an advantage. We also do
not consider the benefits provided under the Supplemental
Security Income program. Finally, we ignore workers under
the age of 25 because of the difficulty of estimating their
future incomes.
The calculations assume that the consumer price level
rises in the future at 4 percent per year. Because of pro-
ductivity growth, real wages rise at 1.75 percent. Future
benefits are discounted to the present with a real discount
rate of 3 percent; this is equivalent to assuming a 7 per-
cent after—tax rate of return when the inflation rate is 4
percent.1 Because the double indexing is assumed to be
1This real rate of interest is higher than households
have obtained for the past 25 years. This again causes our
estimate of social security wealth to be an underestimate.
The appendix presents estimates based on a real discount
rate of one percent.8
removed, the choice of a 4 percent inflation rate is of
little consequence; the real growth of benefits and the real
social security wealth are essentially unchanged if a dif-
ferent inflation rate is assumed.
An example will illustrate the logic of our calcula-
tion of social security wealth. Readers who are not in-
terested in the precise method may skip to the beginning of
section 2 without loss of continuity. Consider a single
working man who was less than 65 years old at the end of
1972. The social security administrative record indicates
his average monthly covered earnings between 1951 and 1972,
together with information about the years in which he did
not have covered earnings. The first step in our calcula-
tion is to estimate covered earnings in each previous year
subject to his given overall average and to the assumed
maxima implied by the social security law. The basic as-
sumption of the interpolation used to obtain the individual
earnings is that wages grow at an exponential rate. Each
individual's growth rate is determined to satisfy the known
1972 earnings and the average for the period. The individ-
ual's earnings are then extrapolated into the future by the
assumption that his 1972 wage will grow at the same rate as
all other wages (i.e., 5.75 percent).
This provides the earnings record for all of the rele-
vant years of his working life, say W for individual i in year
t. This is converted into an indexed wage by dividing each10
For married couples, the calculation is more complex
because (1) an extra benefit is available if the retiree
has a dependent spouse, (2) a surviving spouse is entitled
to a benefit, but (3) if the wife has an earnings record,
she may choose to receive her own benefits as a retired
worker. Our computer program makes all of the correct
choices for the family on the assumption that, if there is
a working wife, she will choose to retire when her husband
reaches age 65.
We recognize that these calculations might be signif i-
cantly improved as more information becomes available. We
nevertheless believe that the current information can pro-
vide a useful basis for analysis.9
by the overall average covered monthly earnings in that
year (W0); individual i's indexed wage is thus W/W0. A
simple average over the relevant number of working years
provides a normalized averaged monthly earnings (NAME) that
is the basis of the benefit calculation.
The NAME for a worker who has always had the average
earnings will be 1. The principle of wage indexing makes
the ratio of the retiree's benefit at age 65 to average
covered earnings in that year a function of his NAME. A
specific table indicates the benefit ratio for each NAME.1
Our calculation uses the NAME to calculate this benefit
ratio and thus the dollar benefit at the time of retirement.
Benefits after retirement are increased at the rate of con-
sumer price inflation.2
This procedure yields the stream of benefits that the
individual will collect at each age after 65 if he is alive.
We find the actuarial discounted value of these benefits as
of 1972 by using the 1970 Census Bureau Actuarial Tables to
calculate the probability of survival and then discounting
future benefits at a nominal rate of 7 percent.
1For values of NAME up to 0.28, the benefit ratio is
0.80; for the next amount of earnings between NAME =0.28
and NAME =0.84,the marginal benefit ratio is 0.35; above
that value of NAME, the marginal benefit ratio is 0.25.
This implies, for example, that a retiree with a NAME of
0.84 receives initial benefits of 50 percent of the product
of NAME and the average earnings in the year of his retire-
ment.
method of describing the benefit calculation may
appear differentfromthe legislative proposal but is actually
computationally equivalent.11
2. Basic Estimates of Social Security Wealth
Our method of estimation implies that the social se-
curity wealth of the population in 1972 was $1.85 trillion,
approximately twice the 1972 national income of $952 billion.
Social security wealth was nearly as large as the 1972 total
financial net worth of the household sector, $2.4 trillion.
Even the most inclusive traditional measure of household sec-
tor wealth1 was $4.0 trillion, about twice the size of our
estimate of social security wealth. By any standard, the
value of social security wealth is of major significance in
describing the total wealth of the population.
Although our detailed evidence is only available for
1972, it is useful to have even a rough estimate of a more
current value. We have made such an estimate on the conser-
vative assumption that social security wealth grew at the
same rate as national income. By the end of the current
(1978) fiscal year, social security wealth will reach $3.4
trillion.
As we emphasized above, even these astoundingly large
figures are likely to be a substantial understatement of so-
cial security wealth. Our estimates deal only with the pop-
ulation over age 25, thus omitting a substantial fraction of
the current and future labor force. Our benefits exclude
'This total net worth includes the value of consumer
durables and the assets of nonprofit organizations.12
payments for disability and dependent children, which to-
gether account formore than 30 percent of the basic benefits
for retirees and surviving spouses. At every point in our
calculation, we have chosen the assumption that would under-
state rather than overstate social security wealth.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 1972 social se-
curity wealth by income and age. Each couple or single in-
dividual is classified by total income in 1972 (excluding
social security benefits) and by the age of individual or,
in the case of couples, by the age of the man.
The most interesting feature of Table 1 is the very
small fraction of the social security wealth that is ac-
counted for by higher incomefamilies.1 Only 8.3 percent of
total social security wealth belongs to families with in-
comes over $25,000. Approximately half of social security
wealth is accounted for by families with incomes over the
1972 median of $11,000.
Since the incomes of retirees and of young workers
are misleading as indicators of their lifetime income posi-
tions, it is useful to look at families in which the head is
between the ages of 35 and 64. A summary for this age group
is presented in the final column of Table 1. Even for this
restricted group, only 11 percent of social security wealth
1We use the term "family" to refer to both couples
and single individuals except where something else is ex-
plicitly stated.14
is accounted for by the families with incomes over $25,000
and 39 percent by families with incomes of $15,000.
This contrasts sharply with the well documented con-
centration of ordinary fungible wealth. Although exact data
on the wealth distribution for 1973 are not available, some
useful inferences can be made on the basis of 1962-63 Fed-
eral Reserve Board Survy of Consumer Finances (Projector
and Weiss, 1966). In an earlier study, Feldstein (1976a)
estimated that, among households in which the head was be-
tween 35 and 64 years old, 63 percent of fungible wealth
belonged to households with incomes over $10,000 and 44 per-
cent to households with incomes over $15,000. Since per
capita personal incomes increased by slightly less than 100
percent between 1962 and 1972, it is reasonable to assume
that by 1973, families with incomes over $25,000 had between
44 and 63 percent of the wealth of their age cohort. This
compares to the mere 11 percent of social security wealth
shown in the last column of Table 1. Stating the same
thing in a different way, the income group that has only
about 50 percent of fungible wealth has more than 90 percent
of social security wealth.'
1Similarly, the 1962 data indicate that families with
1962 incomes under $7,500 had 25 percent of fungible wealth.
If we therefore infer that by 1972 families with incomes
under $15,000 had 24 percent of fungible wealth, this can
be compared with the 65 percent of social security wealth
shown in the last column of Table 1.13
TABLE1
DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH
(Percentages ofTotal Social Security Wealth)
Income
Age
25—34 35—44 45—54 55—64 65+ All 35—64
< $3,000 0.6 0.7 1.1 3.4 17.723.4 8.8
$3,000— 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.4 5.7 5.8
$6,000— 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.8 1.0 10.1 11.4
$9,000— 4.0 3.2 4.3 4.1 1.0 16.6 19.7
$12,000— 3.6 3.1 3.4 2.9 0.5 13.6 15.9
$15,000— 4.9 5.8 6.0 4.5 0.9 22.2 27.7
$25,000— 1.0 1.6 2.5 2.2 0.9 8.3 10.8
All 17.4 17.0 20.7 21.5 23.3100.0100.0
All figures relate to the distribution of 1972 social security
wealth of $l.847 trillion.15
The distribution of social security wealth can be ex-
amined in a different way by studying the average dollar
value of social security wealth at each age and income
level. The basic figures for this analysis are presented
in Table 2. The average individual or couple had $28,093
of social security wealth at the end of 1972. The most im-
portant feature of the distribution is that benefits rise so
little with income. This is best seen by focusing on the
group aged 35 to 64 to avoid the distortion due to the high
wealth and low income of the aged. For this group, social
security wealth per household shows almost no increase with
income over $9,000. Even those with incomes under $3,000
have social security wealth of nearly $18,000, or more than
half the social security wealth of those with incomes over
$25,000.
Separate figures are shown for each age group. A
common feature is that, in each age group, there is little
effect of income over $9,000 on social security wealth. It
is interesting also that, in the group up to age 54, the
highest income class actually has slightly lower social





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. Social Security Wealth Net of Future Taxes
Social security wealth is the actuarial present value
of the benefits to which individuals are entitled at age 65.
The sum of an individual's social security wealth and his
ordinary fungible wealth is thus the present value of the
total resources that would be available for retirement con-
sumption if the individual did no further saving out of
other income) The social security wealth analyzed in the
previous section is therefore the relevant variable to com-
pare to the distribution of fungible wealth.
There is, however, a different concept of social se-
curity wealth, net of future social security taxes, that may
be relevant for discussing other issues. For a person who
has reached age 65 and is ready to retire, there is no dif-
ference between the gross social security wealth of section
3 and the current section's net social security wealth. For
a younger individual, net social security wealth can be con-
siderably less than the gross value.
There is of course substantial debate about the tax
rates that will be levied in future years. Our strategy is
to assume that the maximum taxable wage level will rise at
the same rate as the average wage and that the tax rate will
then be set in each year to make the year's total tax revenue
1That is, if the individual's saving in each future
year until age 65 equaled the income from his fungible wealth.18
equal the year's total benefit outlay.1 The resulting tax
rate rises from 10.7 percent in 1980 to 12.4 percent in
2000 and 14.9 percent in 2015.
The net social security value-—i.e., the value of so-
cial security wealth net of the present value of the indi-
vidual's future social security tax-—measures the value to
the individual of the continued existence of the social se-
curity program. If the program were abolished, he would
lose the future benefits but would also avoid the future
taxes. While eliminating social security is not a relevant
policy option, the estimates of net social security wealth
shows who gains and who loses from the continuation of the
current program and from the adoption of alternative benefit
and tax rules.
2
Note that an individual's net social security wealth
does not measure the lifetime subsidy that he receives from
the social security program. It is equal instead to that
subsidy plus the value of the taxes that he has already paid.
For the entire population over age 25, the net social secur-
ity wealth represents the present value of the net intergen-
erational transfer to it that is yet to take place. In dif-
ferent words, the total net social security wealth of the co-
hort over age 25 is the value of the transfers that they will
1The calculations used to derive this taxrate assume
fertility rates of 1.6 in 1980, 1.8 in 1990, 1.9 in2000 and 2.1 in 2025 and thereafter. A differentassumption about the
maximum taxable earnings is developed inthe next section when priceindexing is discussed.
2There are ofcourse the further gains and losses that arise
to the extent that social security reduces the capital stock and thus
changes factor incomes. These are ignored in the current calculations.19
receive from those who are currently under 25 or yet unborn.
At the end of 1972, the total value of this net social
security wealth was $1.06 trillion, or 57 percent of the
gross social security wealth. By the same extrapolation as
before, this implies a net social security wealth of $2.0
trillion by the end of the current (1978) fiscal year. The
distribution of net social security wealth is shown in Table
3.
The striking feature of Table 3 is that net social se-
curity wealth is actually negative for families aged 25 to
34. These individuals and couples can expect to pay more
in social security taxes than they receive in benefits (when
both are discounted to their present value). Note that this
is true at every income level over $6,000. Since these in-
dividuals have already paid considerable taxes, this repre-
sents a substantial understatement of their net lifetime loss
because of the social security program.
The negative net social security wealth of young f am-
ilies has an important implication about the future social
security program. If the current relation between benefits
and taxes were to remain unchanged, each new generation would
find that its initial net social security wealth was nega-
tive. That is, each generation would pay taxes with a
greater present value than the benefits it received. More-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































will make the situation even worse than Table 3 suggests.
Because the number of retirees will grow more rapidly than
the number of workers, the ratio of taxes to wages must
rise relative to the ratio of benefits to wages. This in
turn means that the net social security wealth of each new
generation will be even more negative.
The net social security wealth has potentially impor-
tant political implications for the social security program.
Anyone with a negative net social security wealth could
gain from a contraction of the social security program.
There are now some 150 million adults of voting age in the
United States. Of these, approximately 50 million have neg-
ative net social security wealth.1 The older groups have
positive net social security wealth because they are closer
to receiving benefits and have fewer taxpaying years left.
Although each generation may lose over its lifetime because
of the social security program, the distribution of net so-
cial security wealth is currently capable of maintaining
and expanding the social security program. However, the
changing demographic structure will increase the fraction
of the population with negative net social security wealth
and could thereby weaken the political support of the pro-
gram. If, for example, net social security wealth only be-
came positive at age 45, a majority of the voting age popu-
1These include the 18 to 24 year olds who are not re-
flected in Table 3.22
lation would have negative net social security wealth. The
changing demography and the resulting deterioration of the
tax—benefit ratio therefore poses a serious threat to the
ability of the program to go on paying the promised benefits
in the future.1
more detailed analysis of who would gain and who
would lose under alternative assumptions about the future
could make the ideas of this paragraph more precise and
operational.4. A PriceIndexed Program
for SocialSecurity
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Second, wage indexing based on the current replacement
rate schedule produces some extremely high replacement rates,
distorting retirement decisions and depressing saving. For
example, while a single worker with median earnings now
gets 43 percent of his immediate preretirement wage, if he
is married he can get 150 percent of this basic benefit.
The married retiree with median earnings thus receives 65
percent of his preretirement income. Since this benefit
is untaxed, it is really equivalent to a replacement of 80
percent or more of net earnings. A worker who is not far
below the median can thus obtain an effective replacement
rate of more than 100 percent. Such high replacement rates
are a strong incentive to retire at 65 or earlier. They
also eliminate the reason for substantial retirement saving,
either directly or through private saving.
These problems with the wage indexing method prompted
the Social Security Advisory Panel directed by William
Hsiao to propose an alternative method that is commonly re-
ferred to as price indexing. The distinguishing character-
istic of the performance of price indexing is that it makes
the individual's replacement rate depend on his real income
rather than his relative income. As real incomes rise over
time, the average replacement rate would fall; social secur-
ity benefits would grow with time but less rapidly than in-
come. This reduced rate of growth of social security bene-25
fits would permit a slower rate of growth of taxes. The
tax rate required to finance the benefits implied by the
Hsiao proposal would be only 10 percent in the year 2000
and 11.3 percent in the year 2050. The lower replacement
rates would also reduce the adverse distortions in retire-
ment and saving behavior.
Table 4 shows the tax rates and maximum taxable earn-
ings under price and wage indexing for selected years.
Note that the total tax revenue in future years is lower
under price indexing both because of the lower tax rate and
the lower maximum taxable earnings.1
It is clear from the difference between the required
tax rates--l9 percent for wage indexing and 11 percent for
price indexing--that price indexing would be substantially
better for the welfare of the population that reaches ma-
turity in the next century and beyond. Moreover, the anal-
ysis presented below shows that the choice between the two
indexing mechanisms has relatively little effect on the so-
cial security wealth of the current population over age 25.
1The basic mechanics of price indexing are similar to
the wage indexing system described in section 2 but with a
price index used instead of a wage index. Thus the maximum
taxable earnings grows each year at the rate of inflation
instead of at the (generally higher) rate of nominal wage
increase. Similarly, the tax payments are converted to
dollars of the retirement year by a price index and the re-
placement rate table is increased for the growth of prices.
The nonlinearity of the benefit schedule causes this to
lower the average replacement ratio.TABLE 4
TAX RATES AND TAX BASE WITH WAGE AND PRICE INDEXING
Year
TaxRate MaximumTaxable Wages
Wage IndexPrice IndexWage IndexPrice Index
1980 10.7 10.6 $19,513 $18,560
1985 11.2 10.5 25,806 22,581
1990 11.8 10.5 34,129 27,474
1995 12.0 10.0 45,137 33,426
2000 12.4 10.0 59,694 40,668
2005 12.9 10.0 78,946 48,478
2010 13.4 10.0 104,408 60,198




2025 12.0 241,511 108,413
2035 12.2 422,415 160,477
2045 11.6 738,827 237,545
Dollar amounts are in the prices of each year; an
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This is true of both the gross social security wealth and
the net social security wealth. Unfortunately, our analysis
also shows why the wage indexing is likely to be chosen by
the political process: at every age and income level, the
net social security wealth is higher with wage indexing than
with price indexing. This difference reflects the fact that
wage indexing is designed to achieve a greater transfer from
the next generation than price indexing. Let us now examine
this evidence more explicitly.
Table 5 compares the gross social security wealth per
family (i.e., couple or single individual) under the two
methods of indexing. The average wealth of $28,093 under
wage indexing is reduced by less than one-fifth to $22,965.
The extent of the reduction varies by age group, with the
greatest differences for the young. But even for this group,
the difference in the present value of benefits is about
one—third. Although we cannot now produce a full analysis
of this issue, we believe that the loss in benefits asso-
ciated with using price indexing would be small relative to
the permanent gains for all future generations that would
thereby be achieved.
Table 6 shows why price indexing is nevertheless un-
likely to be adopted: for every age and income group, the
use of price indexing rather than wage indexing reduces the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































creases net social security wealth. These decreases are
small but the fact that they are decreases implies that,
on selfish grounds, there is no reason for the current
voters to favor price indexing over wage indexing.
The analysis for the youngest group of families may
surprise readers. Before the calculations were done, we
anticipated that this group might have a higher net social
security wealth under price indexing than wage indexing.
We based this anticipation on the much lower tax rate that
they would eventually pay under price indexing. As Table
4 shows, the tax rates do not differ very much during the
next decade but begin to differ quite substantially when
the current group of young families approaches retirement
in 2000 to 2015. However, these tax savings are not enough
to compensate for the lower benefits that price indexing
entails. The much greater difference in tax rates during
their actual period of retirement represents the greater
intergeneration transfer entailed in wage indexing.
The observed political preference for wage indexing
may contain a useful insight about the nature of the social
security program and its historic growth. Wage indexing
was explicitly compared to price indexing and then chosen
by the Ford Administration, the Carter Administration, the
Senate Finance Committee, and the House Committee on Ways
and Means. These decisions can be regarded as an indication31
of a widespread political preference by today's voters to
transfer income to themselves from the next generation of
workers. Seen in this way, the rapid historic growth of
social security is very different from the growth of other
government programs. Social security has grown because
voters are prepared to tax themselves because they expect
that they will actually benefit by receiving more from the
next generation.
This interpretation of the political support for so-
cial security expansion also sheds light on one aspect of
the debate about the effect of social security on private
saving. Barro (1974) has ingeniously argued that social
security need not depress private saving if the current
workers save in order to increase their bequests to offset
the greater tax burden that the social security program im-
poses on their children. This argument regards social se-
curity as a policy imposed on the population "by the govern-
ment" rather than as a policy chosen by the voters them-
selves. It seems more appropriate to regard the generation
of worker-voters as voting to transfer income from future
generations to themselves and therefore as having no desire
to offset this transfer by increased bequests. The nature
of the political support for social security thus implies
that it does in fact reduce private saving.32
5..Summary
An individual's social security wealth is the actuar-
ial present value of the benefits that he will be eligible
to receive at age 65. Unlike most other forms of wealth,
social security wealth is not backed by physical capital in
the form of structures and equipment. Nevertheless, these
claims on future taxpayers are the most important asset for
the majority of American families.
In this paper we have used an important new body of
data to estimate the social security wealth of a represen-
tative sample of 38,000 households.Because the data for
each household include the actual administrative records
of the Social Security Administration, our calculations of
social security wealth are substantially more accurate than
any previous estimates. The sample was chosen in a way that
permits estimating social security wealth for the entire
population and for groups classified by income and age.
In our analysis of these data, we have emphasized
five salient results:
(1) The social security wealth is very large. At
the end of the 1978 fiscal year, the social security wealth
of the population over age 25 will exceed $3.4 trillion.
(2) Social security wealth is distributed very
equally. Households with incomes of $25,000 or more account for
only 10 percent of social security wealth but more than 5033
percent of ordinary fungible wealth. The distribution of
total wealth, including social security wealth, is therefore
very much less concentrated than the distribution of ordi-
nary wealth.
(3) Net social security wealth, i.e., net of future
social security taxes, will be $2.0 trillion by the end of
fiscal year 1978. This represents the transfer to persons
now over 2 5 that will be made by those who are younger or
not yet born. This implicit claim on future transfers pro-
vides strong political support for social security.
(4) The net social security wealth of individuals
aged 25 to 34 is negative: the present value of the taxes
that they will pay exceeds the present value of the benefits
for which they will be eligible. The fraction of the popu-
lation with negative net social security wealth will grow
with time, reducing the political support for high social
security taxes.
(5) The calculation of social security wealth is use-
ful for comparing the "price indexing" method of adjusting
future benefits with the wage indexing method that has been
proposed by both the Ford Administration and the Carter Ad-
ministration. Price indexing would limit the eventual rise
in the payroll tax to 12 percent instead of the 19 percent
or more required by wage indexing. Price indexing would
also have long-run advantages for the supply of both capital
and skilled labor. Our analysis shows that the total social34
security benefits of current workers would be littleaf-
fected by the choice of indexing methods; the difference
in social security wealth between the two methods is less
than 10 percent. Nevertheless, wage indexing promises cur-
rent workers a greater net transfer from future generations;
the net social security wealth is greater under wage in-
dexing for every age group. This may explain its political
support. The growing fraction of the populationwith nega-
tive net social security wealth should serve as a warning:
the choice of wage indexing may not only be bad economics,
but also a bad bet on the generosity of future taxpayers.35
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Social Security Wealth Estimates Based
on a 1 percent Real Discount Rate
This appendix presents tables analogous to Tables
1,2,3 and 6 in the text but based on a real discount rate
of 1 percent. This is close to the real net rate of interest
available over the past 25 years on long-term debt.
Discounting at this lower rate substantially raises
the estimates of social security wealth. The aggregate gross
social security wealth is increased from $1.85 trillion at
the end of 1972 based on a 3 percent real discount rate to
$3.02 trillion with a 1 percent real discount rate. The
corresponding aggregate net social security wealth is in-
creased from $1.06 trillion to $1.99 trillion.
The basic distributional features of these revised
social security estimates are very similar to the results
presented in the text. The only important difference is that
net social security wealth is no longer negative for any
age—income groups. The conclusion that the net social
security wealth is higher for everyone with wage indexing
is unchanged.TABLE 1A
DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH
of Total Social Security W1th)
Income
Age
25—34 35—4445—5455—64 65+All 35—64
<$3,000 0.8 0.8 1.1 2.7 12.618.0 7.8
$3,000— 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.0 5.5 5.7
$6,000— 3.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 0.710.711.1
$9,000— 5.8 3.9 4.2 3.4 0.717.919.7
$12,000— 5.2 3.7 3.4 2.4 0.415.116.3
$15,000— 7.0 7.0 6.0 3.8 0.724.428.6
$25,000+ 1.4 1.9 2.5 1.9 0.7 8.310.8
All 24.9 20.3 20.4 17.7 16.7100.0100.0
figures relate to the distribution of 1972 social
wealth of $l.847 trillion.
Based on 1
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